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PLEADING FOR A BARGAIN:
THE UPCOMING DEBATE OVER
COMPETING STANDARDS OF
PREJUDICE IN MISSOURI V. FRYE
IAN HAMPTON*
I. INTRODUCTION
1

In Missouri v. Frye, the Supreme Court will address a novel
question: whether a criminal defendant who pleads guilty can invoke
the Sixth Amendment’s protection against ineffective assistance of
counsel for his attorney’s failure to communicate an earlier, more
2
favorable plea offer. In adjudicating this question, the Court will have
to decide which of three competing standards of prejudice should
apply, and which remedy is appropriate in this unique factual
3
scenario. More importantly, the Court will be asked to weigh
defendants’ interest in the reliability of the adversarial process against
the state’s interest in the finality of its results, a balance carefully
4
struck in past cases.
II. FACTS
On August 14, 2007, the State of Missouri charged Galin Frye with
5
one count of felony driving for driving with a revoked license. Before
his preliminary hearing, the State sent Frye’s trial counsel a written

* 2013 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law. I am grateful to Siobhan Innes-Gawn
and Kara Duffle for their thoughtful feedback and eye for detail.
1. Missouri v. Frye, No. 10-444 (U.S. argued Oct. 31, 2011).
2. See Brief for the Petitioner at i, Frye, No. 10-444 (U.S. Apr. 15, 2011), 2011 WL
1593613, at *i (framing the question presented as whether “a defendant who validly pleads
guilty [can] successfully assert a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel by alleging that, but
for counsel’s error in failing to communicate a plea offer, he would . . . have pleaded guilty
sooner with more favorable terms”).
3. See infra Parts V.A, V.C.
4. See infra Part V.B.
5. Frye v. Missouri, 311 S.W.3d 350, 351 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010), cert. granted, No. 10-444
(U.S. argued Oct. 31, 2011).
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6

plea offer. A date stamp confirms that trial counsel’s office received
that offer on November 19, 2007, and his own annotations confirm
7
that he read it. The terms of the offer presented Frye with two
options: he could either plead to the felony with a recommended
deferred sentence of three years, or he could serve ninety days on an
8
amended misdemeanor charge. The offer was set to expire on
9
December 28, 2007. Frye claimed that during the offer’s window he
10
did not see or speak with trial counsel. Accordingly, he did not know
about the State’s then-expired plea offer when, on March 3, 2008, he
11
entered an open guilty plea to the felony driving charge. Shortly
thereafter, the trial court sentenced Frye to three years
12
imprisonment.
Frye then filed a motion seeking post-conviction relief in state
13
court. Frye’s motion alleged that trial counsel rendered ineffective
14
assistance by failing to communicate the State’s plea offer. Following
15
an evidentiary hearing, the court denied Frye’s motion. The Missouri
16
Court of Appeals, however, reversed the lower court’s denial, and
17
the Missouri Supreme Court denied transfer.
On September 27, 2010, the State of Missouri filed a petition for
18
writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. On January 7,
19
2011, the Court granted certiorari, certifying the additional question
of what remedy should be provided for ineffective assistance of
20
counsel during plea negotiations.

6. Id.
7. Id. at 352.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 353.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 361.
17. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 2, at 1. In Missouri, transfer is a parallel review
process for motions for post-conviction relief that have been denied. See MO. SUP. CT. R. 83.04
(“Transfer by this Court is an extraordinary remedy that is not part of the standard review
process . . . .”). Because “motions for reconsideration . . . shall not be accepted or filed,” a denial
of transfer amounts to a final judgment. Id.
18. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Missouri v. Frye, No. 10-444 (U.S. Sept. 27, 2010), 2010
WL 3875742.
19. Missouri v. Frye, 131 S. Ct. 856, 856–57 (2011).
20. Id.
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The starting point for any claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel is the standard set forth in the Supreme Court’s 1984 decision
21
in Strickland v. Washington. In cases preceding Strickland, the Court
had held that the Sixth Amendment’s right “to have the Assistance of
22
23
Counsel” includes the right to effective assistance of counsel, and
that counsel could deprive a defendant of that right by “failing to
24
render adequate legal assistance.” But it was not until Strickland that
the Court articulated a clear standard for claims of ineffective
25
assistance of counsel, which is still in use today.
26
Strickland’s “well-worn two pronged standard” first asks whether
27
counsel’s performance was deficient. As the Court explained in
Strickland, “this requires showing that counsel made errors so serious
that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the
28
defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Second—and more important
to this case—the defendant must demonstrate that the deficient
29
performance prejudiced her. Specifically, “the defendant must show
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
30
different.” Because of that language, the Court has come to refer to
31
Strickland’s test for prejudice as the “outcome-determinative test.”
Notably, Strickland only addressed claims of ineffective counsel in the
context of a trial; its stated purpose was “simply to ensure that
32
criminal defendants receive a fair trial.”

21. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
22. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
23. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) (“[I]f the right to counsel guaranteed
by the Constitution is to serve its purpose, defendants cannot be left to the mercies of
incompetent counsel . . . .”).
24. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686 (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
25. See, e.g., Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1403 (2011) (“There is no dispute that
the clearly established federal law here is Strickland v. Washington.”).
26. Jenny Roberts, Proving Prejudice, Post-Padilla, 54 HOW. L.J. 693, 699 (2011) (citation
omitted).
27. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 694.
31. See, e.g., Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 380 n.6 (1993) (referring to “Strickland’s
outcome-determinative test for prejudice”).
32. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
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Within a year, however, the Court applied Strickland to claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel during plea-bargaining. In Hill v.
33
Lockhart, the Court recognized that plea negotiations are a critical
phase of criminal prosecution, on par with the trial itself, and thus
34
warrant the same Sixth Amendment protections. Hill also illustrates
that the Court views effective assistance of counsel in the plea35
bargaining context through the lens of the Due Process Clause.
According to Supreme Court precedent, involuntary plea bargains are
36
a violation of due process. In Hill, the Court construed petitioner’s
claim as “alleging that his guilty plea was involuntary by reason of
37
ineffective assistance of counsel.” Thus, the Court implied that
counsel’s actions in Hill violated due process.
Echoing Strickland’s outcome-determinative test for prejudice, the
Hill Court held that the relevant inquiry is “whether counsel’s
constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the
38
plea process.” The Court went on, however, to say that “the
defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have
39
insisted on going to trial.” Whether this last statement placed a gloss
on the outcome-determinative test is a point of contention among the
40
parties in this case.
Regardless, Hill is materially different from the present case. In
Hill, the petitioner implied, but did not allege, that but for counsel’s
failure to inform him about his probation status, he would have
41
rejected the state’s plea offer and would have opted for trial. Here,
Frye is alleging quite the opposite, contending that he would have
accepted the plea offer in lieu of trial had counsel communicated it to
42
him. Thus, Frye is not claiming that he was deprived of a fair trial; in
33. 474 U.S. 52 (1985).
34. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010) (“We have long recognized that
the negotiation of a plea bargain is a critical phase of litigation for purposes of the Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.” (citing Hill, 474 U.S. at 57)).
35. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
36. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244 (1969).
37. Hill, 474 U.S. at 56.
38. Id. at 59.
39. Id.
40. See infra Part V.A.
41. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 60 (“Petitioner did not allege in his habeas petition that, had
counsel correctly informed him about his parole eligibility date, he would have pleaded not
guilty and insisted on going to trial.”).
42. See Brief for Respondent at 8–9, Missouri v. Frye, No. 10-444 (U.S. July 15, 2011), 2011
WL 2837937, at *8–9 (“Had counsel informed Frye of the state’s plea offer, he would have
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fact, he did not want a trial at all. Accordingly, this case does not fall
squarely within the ambit of either Strickland or Hill.
In sum, aside from some notable aberrations in Lockhart v.
43
44
45
Fretwell and Nix v. Whiteside, discussed below, Hill and Strickland
represent the legal landscape facing the parties as they square off
before the Court. It is worth noting that the Roberts Court seems to
have taken an interest in questions arising from ineffective assistance
of counsel in the plea-bargaining context, perhaps to better define this
area. Two terms ago, for example, the Court heard arguments in
46
Padilla v. Kentucky, holding that counsel performed deficiently by
failing to inform his client of the collateral consequences of a guilty
47
plea. Last term, the Court addressed the question of prejudice
48
during plea negotiations in Premo v. Moore and is poised to do so
again this term, both in the present case and its companion, Lafler v.
49
Cooper.
IV. HOLDING
In Frye v. Missouri, an undivided Missouri Court of Appeals
reversed the lower court’s denial of Frye’s motion for post-conviction
50
relief due to ineffective assistance of counsel. Under Strickland’s
performance prong, the court held that trial counsel’s utter failure to
inform Frye of the State’s plea offer “fell below an objective standard
51
of reasonableness.” Notably, the State did not challenge this part of
52
the appellate court’s holding in its petition for certiorari.

accepted it.”).
43. 506 U.S. 364 (1993).
44. 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
45. See infra Part V.A.
46. 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
47. Id. at 1483.
48. 131 S. Ct. 733, 741 (2011) (holding that counsel’s representation was adequate though
he failed to file a motion to suppress defendant’s confession—a motion counsel deemed
“futile”—before advising him to accept a plea offer).
49. Lafler v. Cooper, No. 10-209 (U.S. argued Oct. 31, 2011). Lafler asks whether “a
defendant [was] denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel where
counsel’s affirmative misadvice causes the defendant to decline a favorable plea offer, and the
defendant is subsequently convicted at trial.” Brief of Respondent Anthony Cooper at i, Lafler,
No. 10-209 (U.S. July 18, 2011), 2011 WL 2837936, at *i.
50. Frye v. Missouri, 311 S.W.3d 350, 351 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010), cert. granted, No. 10-444
(U.S. argued Oct. 31 2011).
51. Id. at 353.
52. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 18, at i (posing the question presented as
whether Strickland’s outcome-determinative test or Hill’s insistence on trial test for prejudice
applies).
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More controversial, however, was the second part of the Missouri
court’s opinion, wherein it held that the court below had erred in
concluding that, under Strickland’s second prong, Frye was not
53
prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance. Here, the court
applied Strickland’s outcome-determinative test to the pleabargaining context rather than Hill’s insistence on trial test, the
54
standard more familiar to that context. According to the court, Hill’s
test for prejudice was merely a “template” for “Strickland’s looser
emphasis on whether a defendant can establish ‘an adverse effect on
55
the defense.’” The court cited similar “adverse effect” language in
56
Hill to support this claim. The court concluded that the proper test
for prejudice was the one announced in Strickland: whether the result
57
of the proceeding would have been different but for counsel’s error.
Although Frye did not contend that he would have opted for trial, he
did claim that he would have taken the plea offer had he known
58
about it, achieving a different result. Accordingly, the Court of
Appeals held that the lower court’s denial of Frye’s motion was
59
“clearly erroneous.”
Although the court found in favor of Frye on the merits, it
declined to order specific performance of the plea offer as a remedy,
60
stating that it lacked the authority to do so. Instead, it remanded the
case to the lower court, acknowledging that although this could lead
to an identical outcome, the “alternative is to ignore the merits of
61
Frye’s claim, which we are unwilling to do.”
V. ARGUMENTS AND ANALYSIS
The crux of the parties’ disagreement in this case is threefold: the
applicable standard of prejudice, the policy implications of that
standard, and the proper remedy. What follows is an exposition and
analysis of both sides’ arguments.
53. Frye, 311 S.W.3d at 359.
54. Id. at 357.
55. Id. (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693 (1984)).
56. Id. (“[T]he defendant must show that [a particular error of counsel] actually had an
adverse effect on the defense.” (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 351.
59. Id. at 359.
60. Id. at 360 (“[W]e are not empowered to order the State to reduce the charge against
Frye.”).
61. Id. at 361.
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A. The Standards Debate: Outcome-Determinative, Insistence on Trial,
or Fundamental Unfairness?
The main point of contention between the parties concerns which
of three standards should be applied to determine whether Frye was
prejudiced by his attorney’s performance. Frye urges that the proper
inquiry is derived from Strickland itself and asks whether the
defendant has shown a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
62
different.” Under this outcome-determinative standard, Frye is all
but assured of prevailing, given that the State does not dispute that
Frye would have accepted the prosecution’s offer of a misdemeanor
63
charge had he known about it.
The State counters that although Strickland required only a
64
showing that results would have differed, Hill “altered that showing”
by requiring proof that but for counsel’s errors, the defendant “would
65
have insisted on going to trial.” On its face, the State’s argument
seems contrary to a fair reading of Hill. To begin with, the Hill Court
stated explicitly that it was applying the “same two-part standard” as
66
in Strickland to the plea-bargaining process, without caveats.
Moreover, the language relied upon by the State is taken out of
context. The Court did require that “the defendant,” as opposed to a
defendant, evince an intention to go to trial to meet the prejudice
67
requirement. That, however, appears to be a case-specific application
of a more general proposition adduced in the immediately preceding
sentence, which reads: the “‘prejudice’ requirement . . . focuses on
whether counsel’s constitutionally ineffective performance affected
68
the outcome of the plea process.” An insistence on trial inquiry is
only relevant, then, insofar as it illuminates whether a particular plea
process was negatively impacted, and not for its own sake. Thus, it
appears that rather than altering the test in Strickland, as the State
alleges, Hill is endorsing Strickland’s outcome-determinative test for

62. Brief for Respondent, supra note 42, at 27 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 694 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 16.
65. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985).
66. Id. at 57 (emphasis added).
67. Id. at 59 (emphasis added).
68. Id.; see also Roberts, supra note 26, at 704 (2011) (“Hill initially articulated a broad
prejudice inquiry that asked whether, given competent representation, the outcome of the plea
process would have been different.”).
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prejudice.
Appearances, however, can be deceiving; the Court has shown
itself reluctant to apply Hill’s more general language to claims of
ineffective counsel in the plea-bargaining context. Last term in Premo
69
v. Moore, a case cited repeatedly in the State’s brief, the Court
reversed the Ninth Circuit’s finding of prejudice where counsel failed
to file a motion suppressing certain evidence before advising the
70
defendant to accept the state’s plea offer. The Court reaffirmed that
Hill’s insistence on trial standard governs the “prejudice [inquiry] in
71
cases involving plea bargains.” Significantly, the Court also rejected a
72
concurrence below that reasoned that the defendant suffered
prejudice because he could have negotiated a better plea offer but for
73
counsel’s failure to suppress evidence. Thus, the Court has already
rejected an argument that closely resembles the gravamen of Frye’s
complaint—that Frye was prejudiced because, but for counsel’s
omission, he would have accepted a plea offer with more favorable
74
terms.
Furthermore, even if Frye could convince the Court to abrogate
its holding in Premo, the State has another arrow in its quiver.
Specifically, the State relies upon Lockhart v. Fretwell and Nix v.
Whiteside for the proposition that an “analysis [like Frye’s] focusing
75
solely on mere outcome determination . . . is defective.” Under
Fretwell, the relevant standard is not whether counsel’s error
produced a different result, but whether it rendered the proceeding
76
“fundamentally unfair or unreliable.” As the Seventh Circuit noted,
the fundamental unfairness test is a higher standard than the
77
outcome-determinative test set forth in Strickland. Perhaps for this

69. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 2, at 18, 20, 35.
70. Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733, 739 (2011).
71. Id. at 745.
72. Id.
73. Moore v. Czerniak, 534 F.3d 1128, 1165 (9th Cir. 2008) (Berzon, J., concurring), rev’d,
131 S. Ct. 733 (2011).
74. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 42, at 27 (“Frye Suffered Prejudice Because Had
He Been Informed of the Plea Offer the Outcome Would Have Been Different: He Would
Have Received a Much Shorter Sentence . . . .”).
75. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 2, at 30 (emphasis added) (quoting Lockhart v.
Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
76. Fretwell, 506 U.S. at 369.
77. See Washington v. Smith, 219 F.3d 620, 632 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting that “there is some
superficial tension between Strickland’s statement of the prejudice standard . . . [and] the
heightened prejudice standard in Lockhart”).
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78

reason, the Court in Williams v. Taylor clarified that the Fretwell test
applies only in situations where counsel’s deficient performance “does
[not] deprive the defendant of a substantive or procedural right to
79
which the law entitles him.” The State contends that this is the case
80
here —neither Frye nor any other criminal defendant has a
81
constitutional right to a particular plea bargain. Accordingly, the
State argues that Fretwell’s heightened prejudice standard ought to
82
apply to this case.
In a deft legal gambit, Frye attempts to redefine the procedural
right in this case as an entitlement to information rather than a right
83
to the plea offer itself. Specifically, Frye contends that because he
“was entitled to be informed of the plea offer extended by the state,”
he was deprived of a procedural right and therefore received
84
ineffective assistance of counsel. Yet Frye claims elsewhere in his
brief that ineffective assistance of counsel rendered his guilty plea
85
involuntary and uninformed. Thus, Frye’s attempt to reframe the
procedural right in order to avoid the heightened prejudice standard
is circular: an uninformed plea is a predicate to ineffective assistance
of counsel, and ineffective assistance of counsel is a predicate to an
uninformed plea. Consequently, Frye’s attempt to divine a violated
procedural right, thereby bringing his case within the ambit of the
more lenient standard in Strickland, is ultimately unconvincing.
In sum, the State has the edge in the debate over which legal
standard to apply in this case. Given the Court’s decision in Premo v.
Moore and Frye’s inability to coherently demonstrate a deprivation of
his rights, the Court likely will apply Hill’s insistence on trial or

78. 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
79. Id. at 393 (emphasis omitted); see also id. (“Cases such as Nix . . . and Lockhart . . . do
not justify a departure from a straightforward application of Strickland when the ineffectiveness
of counsel does deprive the defendant of a substantive or procedural right.”). For an example of
how the federal circuit courts have applied this threshold deprivation test, see United States v.
Springs, 988 F.2d 746, 749 (7th Cir. 1993), in which the Seventh Circuit held that because the
defendant had “no substantive or procedural right to bargain-basement sentences . . . [he] did
not suffer ‘prejudice.’” Id.
80. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 2, at 27.
81. Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507 (1984) (“A plea bargain standing alone is without
constitutional significance . . . .”).
82. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 2, at 30–31.
83. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 42, at 36 (“Frye was entitled to effective counsel
who would advise him of the State’s plea offer. He was entitled to awareness of the alternatives
available to him before he decided whether to accept a plea offer and plead guilty.”).
84. Id. at 34.
85. Id. at 24–25.
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Fretwell’s fundamental unfairness standard to Frye’s case.
B. The Debate Behind the Debate: Reliability of the Adversarial
Process versus the Finality of Its Results
The standards debate, critical as its resolution will be to the
adjudication of Missouri v. Frye, sets the stage for an equally
important policy discussion underlying the parties’ arguments.
86
Strickland itself deemphasizes “mechanical rules” and urges courts
to focus on the two competing interests implicated by the right to
effective assistance of counsel—namely, the reliability of the
87
adversarial process and the finality of its results. The outcomedeterminative standard set forth in Strickland is less of a legal
talisman than a practical attempt to balance defendants’ interest in a
88
reliable process with the state’s interest in the finality of convictions.
A low standard, which makes it easy for defendants to prove counsel
was ineffective, would “encourage the proliferation of ineffectiveness
89
challenges,” thus undermining existing convictions. A high standard,
which places a heavy burden on defendants to prove ineffective
assistance, would prevent defendants from asserting their right to
90
effective assistance of counsel, a fundamental part of a fair trial.
The parties, sensitive to the importance of these policy arguments,
devote considerable portions of their briefs to discussing them. The
State lays out a parade of horribles that will follow from the
91
application of Strickland’s outcome-determinative test in this case.
The State makes two particularly egregious claims—that a decision in
favor of Frye will lead to a proliferation of ineffective assistance of
counsel challenges, and that it will provide defense counsel with an
incentive to intentionally withhold plea offers from their clients.
First, the State asserts that the application of Strickland’s
outcome-determinative standard to plea negotiations will “fail to

86. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696 (1984).
87. See id. at 693, 687 (discussing “the profound importance of finality in criminal
proceedings” and of “a trial whose result is reliable”).
88. Ivan Fong, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at Capital Sentencing, 39 STAN. L. REV.
461, 486 (1987) (“Thus, Strickland appears to balance evenly the competing interests . . . .”).
89. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.
90. See Fong, supra note 88 (“If, on the other hand, defendants face too stringent a
standard for proving ineffectiveness, then their attorneys’ errors [would be] insufficient to
establish a remediable claim . . . .”).
91. See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 2, at 34–37.
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92

preserve the interests of finality in a vast number of cases.” This
essentially rehashes a concern the Court expressed in Strickland
93
about the proliferation of challenges, only here, the State is arguing
against, rather than for, the standard in Strickland.
Is it plausible that the application of Strickland will lead to an
increase in ineffective assistance of counsel claims in the pleabargaining context? At first blush, this seems likely: in 1983, the year
before the Court decided Strickland, there were seventy-two district
court ineffective assistance of counsel decisions published in a major
94
database; in 2010, there were 7,687. Although this is a significant
increase, ineffective assistance of counsel challenges to attorney
performance during plea negotiations currently account for a
95
relatively small portion of habeas petitions—around thirty percent.
As the Court recently noted in Padilla v. Kentucky, this may be
because defendants who collaterally attack their plea bargains run the
96
risk of a less favorable outcome on remand. One concern is that this
97
“significant limiting principal” does not apply here. The remedy
sought is not a new trial with all its attendant uncertainty, but
98
precisely the same plea bargain that the prosecutor initially offered.
If challenging a plea bargain becomes a riskless endeavor—and
raising a challenge becomes easier under the more lenient prejudice
standard in Strickland—it seems reasonable that there will be more
ineffective assistance of counsel claims of this nature.
The State’s second policy argument is less compelling. The State
contends that affirming the Missouri court will provide defense
attorneys with a perverse incentive to intentionally withhold plea
99
offers from their clients as an “insurance policy.” In the event that
trial does not end in a verdict as favorable as the offer, a defendant
could reclaim the banked offer by alleging ineffective assistance of

92. Id. at 35.
93. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 (concluding that a lower standard for prejudice would
“encourage a proliferation of ineffectiveness challenges”).
94. Westlaw Search Results for “ineffective assistance of counsel,” WESTLAW,
http://westlaw.com (search “ineffective assistance of counsel & da(1983)” and “ineffective
assistance of counsel & da(2010)” in the DCT database).
95. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 n.14 (2010) (citing VICTOR FLANGO,
NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, HABEAS CORPUS IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 36–38
(1994)).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1485.
98. Brief for Respondent, supra note 42, at 37.
99. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 2, at 36.
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100

counsel. This argument is unconvincing for two reasons. First, as the
American Bar Association claims in its amicus brief, this
“sandbagging” tactic would violate ethics rules because it would entail
a failure to “communicate to [one’s] client an evidently advantageous
101
plea offer.” This is not a viable strategy for all but the least ethical
practitioners. Second, an iteration of the same argument could be
made against ineffective assistance claims generally. Because post102
conviction relief is available for ineffective assistance of counsel,
defense attorneys will conceivably always have an incentive to
“sandbag” in some way, hoping that their intentional mistakes will
furnish the basis for a future ineffective assistance of counsel claim—
and a second bite at the proverbial apple—should they lose at trial.
Yet, the Court apparently has not found this potential harm
103
sufficiently compelling to overrule Strickland.
Despite the implausibility of the State’s “insurance policy”
argument, the State’s arguments concerning the potential increase in
ineffective assistance claims could sway a Court closely divided on the
standards debate. Applying the less stringent standard in Strickland
while permitting ineffective assistance claimants the remedy of their
original plea offers may well lead to the relitigation of numerous
104
guilty pleas. In order to avoid a deluge of ineffective assistance
claims, the Court may decide in favor of a more stringent standard.
C. The Question of Remedies
If Frye prevails on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, he
will still need to convince the Court that the appropriate remedy is
specific performance—allowing him “to plead guilty to a
105
misdemeanor with a recommendation of a ninety-day jail sentence.”
The question of the proper remedy for ineffective assistance of
counsel in failing to communicate a plea offer is one of novel
impression for the Court. In its order granting certiorari, the Court
100. Id.
101. Brief of the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at
15, Missouri v. Frye, No. 10-444 (U.S. July 22, 2011), 2011 WL 3151278, at *15.
102. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 671 (1984) (“This case requires us to
consider the proper standards for judging a criminal defendant’s contention that the
Constitution requires a conviction or death sentence to be set aside because counsel’s assistance
at the trial or sentencing was ineffective.”).
103. See, e.g., Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1403 (2011) (“There is no dispute that
the clearly established federal law here is Strickland v. Washington.”).
104. See supra Part V.B.
105. Brief for Respondent, supra note 42, at 37.
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requested that the parties brief and argue an additional issue: “[W]hat
remedy, if any, should be provided for ineffective assistance of counsel
106
during plea bargain negotiations”? There are only a handful of cases
remotely on point, but from the authorities cited by the parties, the
shape of a permissible remedy in this context begins to emerge.
In 1971, for example, the Supreme Court held that specific
performance was an appropriate remedy in plea bargain cases, though
107
subject to certain rules and restrictions: Santobello v. New York
establishes that, notwithstanding the Solicitor General’s concerns
108
about displacing prosecutorial discretion, a court may order the
government to “fully comply with the [plea] agreement—in effect,
109
specific performance of the contract.” Specific performance is
limited to executed plea agreements, however, and even then is only
110
available to remediate an involuntary or unknowing guilty plea.
Furthermore, the trial judge retains the authority to reject the terms
111
of a plea offer during sentencing.
Given these guidelines, Frye’s proposed remedy appears almost
entirely appropriate for three reasons. First, Santobello establishes a
112
precedent for the remedy of specific performance. Second, if the
Court has reached the stage where it must consider the proper
remedy, it likely will have already determined that Frye’s plea was
113
involuntary or unknowing. Third, as Frye observes, ordering specific
106. Missouri v. Frye, 131 S. Ct. 856, 856–57 (2011).
107. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
108. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 29, Missouri
v. Frye, No. 10-444 (U.S. Apr. 22, 2011), 2011 WL 1536720, at *29 (“[E]nforcing the terms of a
prior offer displaces prosecutorial discretion.”).
109. Puckett v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1423, 1430 (2009) (citing Santobello, 404 U.S. at
263).
110. See Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507, 510 (1984) (holding that “[a] plea bargain
standing alone is without constitutional significance . . . until embodied” in an executed
agreement, and that “because it did not impair the voluntariness or intelligence of his guilty
plea, respondent’s inability to enforce the prosecutor’s offer is without constitutional
significance”).
111. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262 (1971) (“A court may reject a plea in exercise of sound
judicial discretion.”).
112. See id. at 263 (“The ultimate relief to which petitioner is entitled we leave to the
discretion of the state court, which is in a better position to decide whether the circumstances of
this case require only that there be specific performance of the agreement on the plea . . . .”).
113. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985) (noting that the cognizable claim in
ineffective assistance cases within the plea-bargaining context is “that [defendant’s] plea was
‘involuntary’ as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel”); see also Brief for Respondent,
supra note 42, at 24 (“Failure to communicate a plea offer renders a subsequent guilty plea
unknowing, unintelligent, and involuntary . . . .”); cf. Chaffin v. Stynchcomb, 412 U.S. 17, 28 n.15
(1977) (“Because we have concluded that [Petitioner’s argument is not meritorious], we need
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performance would not usurp the trial judge’s discretion because the
114
ninety-day jail sentence is merely a recommendation. The one
sticking point for Frye is that, as the Solicitor General rightly argues,
115
the plea agreement was unexecuted because Frye never accepted it.
116
“[P]lea bargains are essentially contracts,” and without acceptance,
117
no contract is formed. Accordingly, unless the Court alters its
existing precedent in this area, Frye’s proposed remedy is actually
inappropriate.
VI. LIKELY DISPOSITION
The likeliest outcome is a reversal of the Missouri Court of
Appeals. The State has two ways to win, each well grounded in
precedent. First, the Court may hold that Hill cabined the application
of Strickland to cases where defendants would have insisted on going
118
to trial. Second, the State could prevail on its argument that
straightforward application of Strickland’s outcome-determinative
test is unwarranted under Williams because the loss of a plea offer
119
does not amount to deprivation of a substantive or procedural right.
Indeed, in oral argument, Justice Breyer telegraphed that the Court
might apply the insistence on trial or fundamental unfairness
standard, endorsing “the idea of ineffective assistance of counsel
during the plea bargaining stage,” but proposing that the Court apply
120
“two tougher standards for this area.”
Given the force of the State’s arguments, Frye finds himself in the
unenviable position of having to argue against the weight of authority.
First, he will have to convince the Court that his novel interpretation
of Hill is warranted, despite the fact that the Court just recently
rejected that interpretation in Premo v. Moore. Second, Frye will have
not consider what remedy would be required.”).
114. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 42, at 45 (“The trial court retains the authority to
reject the plea offer.”).
115. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note
108, at 29 (“[I]nstead of restoring the defendant to his original position, the remedy of specific
performance awards him with something he never had: a legal entitlement to the benefits of the
offer.”).
116. Puckett v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1423, 1430 (2009).
117. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 18, 50 (1981) (stating that a valid
contract requires a “manifestation of mutual assent,” and “acceptance of an offer is a
manifestation of assent to the terms thereof”).
118. See supra Part V.A.
119. See Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507 (1984) (“A plea bargain standing alone is
without constitutional significance . . . .”).
120. Transcript of Oral Argument, Missouri v. Frye at 16, No. 10-444 (U.S. Oct. 31, 2011).
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to convince the Court of his circular argument that an uninformed
guilty plea is both the predicate and consequence of ineffective
assistance of counsel in the plea negotiation phase. It is difficult to
imagine the Court sustaining such an incoherent position.
In addition to having the stronger side of the standards debate, the
State benefits from the support of the Solicitor General’s office as
amicus curiae. In the first two terms of Chief Justice Roberts’s tenure,
the Court sided with the Government in nearly ninety percent of
121
cases for which the Solicitor General submitted an amicus brief.
Moreover, given the miniscule chance of prevailing on an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim brought in federal court for a noncapital
122
case—only one in every 1,692 is successful —the probabilities weigh
against Frye and his amici in this case.
Nonetheless, Frye should be heartened by the Court’s holding in
Padilla v. Kentucky two terms ago. Although the Court did not reach
123
the issue of prejudice in that case, Padilla represents a significant
124
expansion of the right to effective counsel. The Court imposed on
counsel an affirmative obligation to advise clients of the collateral, as
125
well as the direct, consequences of their pleas. Of equal importance
to Padilla’s holding were its proponents: Justices Alito and Roberts
126
joined the liberal wing of the Court in a concurring opinion. This is
surprising, especially given Justice Alito’s dissent in United States v.
127
Gonzalez-Lopez, in which he expressed characteristically pragmatic
concerns that the finality of convictions would be imperiled if the
right to counsel of choice, a close cousin of the right to effective
128
counsel, were expanded.

121. Ryan Juliano, Note, Policy Coordination: The Solicitor General as Amicus Curiae in
the First Two Years of the Roberts Court, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 541, 552 (2009).
122. See Joseph L. Hoffman, Rethinking the Federal Role in State Criminal Justice, 84
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 791, 811 (2009) (citing a Vanderbilt-NCSC study).
123. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478 (2010) (“Whether he is entitled to relief
depends on whether he has been prejudiced, a matter we do not address.”).
124. Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to
Consumer Protection, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1117, 1118 (2011) (“Padilla is a landmark interpretation
of the Sixth Amendment’s right to effective assistance of counsel . . . .”).
125. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482.
126. Id. at 1487 (Alito, J., concurring).
127. 548 U.S. 140 (2006).
128. See id. at 160 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Under the majority’s holding, some defendants
will be awarded new trials even though it is clear that the erroneous disqualification of their
first-choice counsel did not prejudice them in the least.”); see also Bibas, supra note 124, at 1150
(describing Justice Alito’s approach as “intensely pragmatic. . . . befit[ting] his experience as a
federal prosecutor”).
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Perhaps Justice Alito’s concerns about finality were allayed in
Padilla by the majority’s observation that collateral attacks on guilty
pleas account for a relatively small fraction of habeas petitions. As
previously discussed, however, the limiting principle posed by the risk
of a less favorable sentence on remand does not apply here. Thus,
Justices already concerned with the impact of ineffective assistance
claims on the finality of convictions are bound to be more receptive to
the State’s claim that a decision for Frye will “fail to preserve the
129
interests of finality in a vast number of cases.” This was evident
during oral argument when Justice Alito worried aloud that
defendants could too easily prove prejudice under the outcome130
determinative standard. Accordingly, any liberal coalition in favor of
Frye likely will not find an ally in Justice Alito or Chief Justice
Roberts, Justice Alito’s codissenter in Gonzalez-Lopez.
Similarly, Justices Scalia and Thomas will almost certainly oppose
any decision favoring Frye. In his dissent to the majority opinion in
Padilla, which Justice Thomas joined, Justice Scalia explicitly stated
that he “reject[s] the significant further extension [of the right to
effective counsel] that the Court . . . would create,” and implicitly
131
called into question whether even Strickland was rightly decided.
In sum, the Court likely will reverse the Missouri court of appeals,
rejecting the application of the Strickland standard to the pleabargaining context. Even if Padilla signals that the Court is favorably
disposed to an expansion of the effective counsel right, affirmation of
the Missouri court probably would be decided narrowly, in a five-four
split. And, even if the Court were to affirm, it would be unlikely to
order specific performance of the plea bargain because Frye did not
accept the State’s offer. Ultimately, the decision will come down to
what a majority of the Court finds more disconcerting: the ineptitude
of Frye’s counsel or the finality concerns raised by the State. For the
ninety percent of convicts who enter the criminal justice system on a
132
plea bargain, much may ride on that determination.

129. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 2, at 35.
130. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 120, at 39 (Alito, J.) (“The point is just
that prejudice isn’t going to be very tough to show, is it?”).
131. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1495 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. (“Even assuming the
validity of these holdings . . . .”).
132. Allison O. Larsen, Bargaining Inside the Black Box, 99 GEO. L.J. 1567, 1612 n.102
(2011) (“[R]oughly ninety percent of the criminal defendants convicted . . . plead guilty rather
than exercise their right to stand trial before a court or jury.” (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted)).

